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This paper develops a model of competitive price discrimination with horizontal and ver-
tical diﬀerentiation. The main application is to add-on pricing – advertising low prices
for one good in hopes of selling additional products at high prices. Price discrimination is
self-reinforcing: the model sometimes has both equilibria in which all ﬁrms practice price
discrimination and equilibria in which none do. The paper focuses on the Chicago-school ar-
gument that proﬁts earned on add-ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised
goods. The most important observation is that the adoption of add-on pricing practices can
create an adverse selection problem that makes price-cutting unappealing, thereby raising
equilibrium proﬁts. Although proﬁtable when jointly adopted, using add-on pricing is not
individually rational in the simplest model with endogenous advertising strategies. Several
models that could account for the prevalence of add-on pricing are discussed.
JEL Classiﬁcation No.: L13, M301 Introduction
In many businesses it is customary to advertise a base price for a product and to try to
sell additional “add-ons” at high prices at the point of sale. The quoted price for a hotel
room typically does not include phone calls, in-room movies, minibar items, dry cleaning,
or meals in the hotel restaurant. Advertised prices for personal computers are typically
for computers with little memory, a low-capacity hard disk, and no separate video card.
Appliance stores push extended warranties. Car rental agencies push insurance and prepaid
gasoline. New car dealers hope to service cars they sell. Manufacturers of new homes oﬀer
a plethora of upgrades and options that can add hundreds of thousands of dollars to their
price. When one takes a broad view of what constitutes add-on pricing it can be a challenge
to think of a business that doesn’t sell add-ons.
Add-ons are clearly a major source of revenues for many ﬁrms.1 Some consumer groups
complain bitterly about them. Whether we should really care much about add-ons is less
clear, however. The examples given above all involve fairly competitive industries. The
classic Chicago-school argument would be that proﬁts earned on add-ons will be competed
away in the form of lower prices for the base good.2 In this paper, I develop a competitive
price discrimination model to examine this and other issues.
The model is similar to that of Lal and Matutes (1994), but with vertical as well as
horizontal taste diﬀerences. Two ﬁrms are located at the opposite ends of a Hotelling line.
Each ﬁrm has two products for sale: a base good and an add-on. The add-on provides
additional utility if consumed with the base good. There are two continuums of consumers:
“high types” with a low marginal of income; and “low types” or “cheapskates” with a
high marginal utility of income. Within each subpopulation, consumers have have unit
demands for the base good with the standard uniformly distributed idiosyncratic preference
for buying from ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2. I equate the “practice of add-on pricing” with playing
a game in which ﬁrms only announce the price of the base good so consumers must incur
a sunk cost to learn a ﬁrm’s price for the add-on. The analysis consists primarily of
contrasting the outcome of this game with the outcome of a “standard pricing game” in
which the ﬁrms simultaneously announce both a price for the base good and a price for a
1Credit card companies, for example, were reported to have received $7 billion in late payment fees in
2001. See http://money.cnn.com/2002/05/21/pf/banking/cardfees/.
2Two formalizations of this argument can be found in the literature. Lal and Matutes (1994) develops
a model of loss-leader pricing in which the Chicago view is true to an extreme – every consumer purchases
the same bundle at the same price regardless of whether the prices of add-ons are or are not advertised.
Verboven (1999) analyzes a model of add-on pricing with diﬀerent assumptions about preferences in which
add-on pricing again has no eﬀect on proﬁts.
1bundle containing the base good and the add-on.3
The most important assumption of the model is that “high type” consumers are both
more likely to buy high-priced add-ons and less likely to switch between ﬁrms to take
advantage of a small price diﬀerence. This is intended to ﬁt to two types of applica-
tions. The traditional application would be to discrimination between wealthy versus poor
consumers (or businessmen versus tourists). Both assumptions about behavior would be
natural consequences of wealthy consumers’ having a lower marginal utility of income. A
second “behavioral” application would be to sophisticated vs. unsophisticated consumers –
with unsophisicated consumers as the high types. Unsophisticated consumers may be less
sensitive to price diﬀerences because they are worse at comparison shopping.4 They may
also be more likely to intentionally or unintentionally buy overpriced add-ons, e.g. they
may incur late-payment fees on their credit cards or be talked into unnecessary rental car
insurance.
Section 3 of the paper shows that whether ﬁrms practice add-on pricing is irrelevant
when the preferences of the high and low types are not too diﬀerent. It is not hard to
construct models in which practicing add-on pricing has no eﬀect: the simplest would be
a price competition game where ﬁrms announce a price and then are allowed to charge
all consumers exactly $17 more than the price they announced. The mechanism behind
the irrelevance result of section 3 is similar. Because types aren’t very diﬀerent, ﬁrms sell
the add-on to everyone rather than trying to use it to price discriminate. As a result,
having an unadvertised add-on is just like having an extra $17 fee that everyone pays. One
could think of section 3 as contributing to the literature in showing that Lal and Matutes’
irrelevance result (1994) is robust to adding a small amount of vertical diﬀerentiation. Lal
and Matutes’ result, however, is nonrobust to other minor changes, so this is of limited
interest. I include section 3 is primarily to provide a base case that can be contrasted with
later results about add-on pricing being important.
Section 4 analyzes the model in a more interesting case. The preferences of the high and
low types are assumed to be more diﬀerent. One consequence of this is that the “standard
pricing game” becomes a competitive second degree price discrimination model. It has an
3In this regard the paper is similar to Verboven (1999), which also analyzes these two games in an
environment with horizonal and vertical diﬀerentiation. Verboven’s paper, however, is more like those of
Holton (1957), Lal and Matutes (1994) and Gabaix and Laibson (2004) in that is focuses on the fact that
add-ons are sold at high prices. It does not explicitly discuss whether proﬁts earned on add-ons are competed
away, and does not identify the eﬀect highlighted in this paper. Indeed, the competition-softening eﬀect I
highlight is not present in Verboven’s model due to a diﬀerence in the structure of the vertical preferences.
4Hausman and Sidak (2004) present evidence that less-educated and lower-income customers pay more
for long distance service.
2equilibrium where the ﬁrms oﬀer the base good at a low price and the base good plus the
add-on at a higher price, and consumers self-select with the low types buying the base
good and the high types also buying the add-on. One reason why most work on price
discrimination examines monopolies is that competitive second degree price discrimination
models can be complicated. The model of this paper illustrates that they can also be simple:
the incentive compatibility constraints all turn out to be nonbinding, so one can (almost)
just analyze competition for the low- and high-types separately. Another interesting feature
of the standard pricing game is that it sometimes has multiple equilibria: there can be a
second equilibrium in which the ﬁrms don’t discriminate. The multiplicity reﬂects that the
beneﬁts of price discrimination are larger when one’s rival is discriminating.
The paper’s most important contribution is that it identiﬁes a reason why the joint
adoption of add-on pricing may raise equilibrium proﬁts. This also comes out in section
4, where the add-on pricing game is shown to have an equilibrium with higher profts than
any of the equilibria of the standard pricing game. The mechanism may be practically
important for understanding how ﬁrms survive in a number of industries. In many of the
examples I mentioned, e.g. hotels, car rental agencies, and retail stores, ﬁrms are minimally
diﬀerentiated and yet prices must be substantially above marginal costs to let ﬁrms recover
ﬁxed costs. The eﬀects of add-on pricing could be an important addition to the set of
explanations for how marginal cost pricing can be avoided.
The mechanism behind the result is fairly intuitive. In the add-on pricing game, it is
obvious that the add-ons will be very expensive – as in Diamond’s (1971) original search
model (and Lal and Matutes (1994)) the fact that ﬁrms will otherwise have an incentive to
make the unadvertised prices  higher than consumers expect leads to the add-ons being
sold at the monopoly price. The more important question is whether the rents earned
selling add-ons are fully competed away. One way to think about why they are not in the
situations analyzed is section 4 is to think of the ﬁrms as intentionally creating an adverse
selection problem in order to soften competition. By now even introductory economics
classes explain how adverse selection limits the completeness of health insurance policies:
if a ﬁrm were to oﬀer a more complete policy, then it would attract a customer pool
with disproportionate share of sick people. When customers are heterogeneous in their
marginal utility of income, there is a similar selection eﬀect in any business: a ﬁrm that
undercuts its rivals on price will attract a customer pool that contains a disproportionate
share of cheapskates. If each ﬁrm sells a single good, this is a selection eﬀect, but not an
adverse selection eﬀect: a cheapskate’s money is as good as anyone else’s. When ﬁrms oﬀer
3multiple goods and add-on pricing policies keep the low- and high quality prices far apart,
the selection becomes adverse: ﬁrms do not want to attract a large number of cheapskates
who only buy the low-priced item (which may even be sold at a loss). The incentive to cut
price is reduced and equilibrium proﬁts go up.
Some of the welfare results are exactly as one would expect. Comparing the equilibrium
of the add-on pricing game with the equilibrium of the standard pricing game (in which
add-ons are cheaper), I note that high-type consumers are made worse oﬀ and low-type
consumers are made better oﬀ by the practice of add-on pricing. A more interesting welfare
result concerns what would happen if the government could mandate that the add-on
must be provided free of charge, e.g. via laws like those mandating that landlords in
Massachusetts cannot charge tenants for water and that rental car companies in California
cannot charge for a spouse as an additional driver. In contrast to what what one normally
ﬁnds in monopoly price discrimination models (and in contrast to basic intuition about
restricting consumer choice being bad), such a policy would make all consumers better oﬀ.
High types gain because they pay lower prices. Low types are better oﬀ despite paying
more because they get a higher quality good.
Section 5 turns to the question of how one can account for the prevalence of add-on
pricing. The ﬁrst observation is that in the simplest model with an endogenous choice of
what to advertise, practicing add-on pricing is not individually rational. Deviating from
using add-on pricing would let a ﬁrm exploit a rival that has less pricing ﬂexibility. Section
5 then discusses a variety of ways in which one could write down models in which add-on
pricing is individually rational. One is to suppose that there are per product advertising
costs. Another relies on tacit collusion. Another is a behavioral explanation: the additional
proﬁts that a ﬁrm may extract from rational consumers by advertising prices for add-ons
may be outweighed by losses incurred when the advertisements inform irrational consumers.
Section 6 examines a variant of the model in which only a small fraction of the population
are cheapskates. In this model adopting add-on pricing is a classic example of a competitive
strategy that turns lemons into lemonade. It does not just mitigate the damage that
cheapskates do to equilibrium proﬁts; it creates an environment where ﬁrms beneﬁt from
the presence of cheapskates.
Section 7 relates the paper to the literatures on loss-leaders, competitive price discrim-
ination, switching costs, and other topics. Section 8 concludes.
42 Model
I consider a variant of the standard competition-on-a-line model with vertical as well as
horizontal diﬀerentiation. There are two ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ {1,2}. Each ﬁrm sells two
vertically diﬀerentiated goods, L and H, and prices piL and piH. The ﬁrms can produce
either L or H at a constant marginal cost of c.5 Consumers diﬀer in two dimensions. First,
they diﬀer in their marginal utility α of income. There are a unit mass of consumers with
α = αh and a unit mass of consumers with α = α`. We assume αh < α`. Thinking
about their willingness to pay I will refer to group h as the “high” types and to group `
as the “low” or “cheapskate” types. Within each group customers are diﬀerentiated by a
parameter θ ∼ U[0,1] that reﬂects how well the two ﬁrms’ products match their tastes.6
Assume that each consumer wishes to purchase at most one unit of one of the two products.
Assume that a consumer receives zero utility if he or she does not make a purchase. If a
consumer of type (α,θ) purchases exactly one unit his or her utility is
u(q1L,q1H,q2L,q2H;α,θ) =

   
   
v − θ − αp1H if q1H = 1
v − (1 − θ) − αp2H if q2H = 1
v − w − θ − αp1L if q1L = 1
v − w − (1 − θ) − αp2L if q2L = 1
Note the assumption of a lower marginal utility of income implies that the high types have
a higher incremental valuation for high quality in money terms and are less sensitive to
price diﬀerences between the ﬁrms. One could apply the model to any situation where this
association makes sense even if it has nothing to do with diﬀerences in the marginal utility
of wealth. For example, in the credit card market the low types could be wealthier, more
sophisticated consumers who compare annual fees and interest rates more carefully when
choosing between oﬀers and who also are less likely to incur late payment fees.
Sections 3 and 4 will contrast the outcomes of two games: a standard price competition
game in which the ﬁrms simultaneously post prices for both products; and an add-on pricing
game where the ﬁrms post prices for good L and reveal their prices for good H only when
consumers visit the ﬁrm. Consumers will, of course, have rational expectations about the
nonposted prices. To model what happens if (out of equilibrium) these expectations turn
out to be incorrect, I adopt a version of Diamond’s search model where consumers incur a
small sunk cost of s utils in visiting a ﬁrm. This cost must be incurred to purchase from
a store or to learn its price for good H. Timelines for the standard pricing game and the
5Good L can be thought of as a “damaged good” as in Deneckere and McAfee (1996).
6Note that I have ﬁxed the range of the idiosyncratic taste parameter. To capture markets with only a
small amount of horizontal diﬀerentiation, one would assume that α` and αh are both large.







Consumers see p1L and p2L.
They can choose at cost s
to visit one ﬁrm. If so, they
see piH and can buy L or H.
Consumers who visited a
store at t = 3 may incur s
to visit the other store.
If so, they can buy or not.





Consumers see all prices.
They can choose at cost s
to visit one ﬁrm. If so, they
can buy L or H from it.
Consumers who visited a
store at t = 3 may incur s
to visit the other store.
If so, they can buy or not.
The Add-on Pricing Game
The Standard Pricing Game
Figure 1: Timelines for the standard pricing and add-on pricing games
add-on pricing game are shown in Figure 1.7 The standard pricing game is similar, but
with each ﬁrm choosing both prices at t = 1 and with consumers observing all prices.
In analyzing the model I will look at sequential equilibria. If the model were speciﬁed as
a game between the ﬁrms with consumer behavior represented by demand functions, then
it would be a complete information game in which one would require subgame perfection.
With consumers as players in the game, however, one must deal with consumers’ beliefs
about the nonposted prices. The key restriction that sequential equilibrium places on these
beliefs is that if a consumer visits ﬁrm 1 at t = 3 and learns that it has deviated from its
equilibrium strategy, then the consumer continues to believe that ﬁrm 2’s nonposted price
is given by ﬁrm 2’s equilibrium strategy. In the standard pricing game the sequential and
subgame perfect equilibria coincide.
In the model all consumers will purchase either L or H in equilibrium if v is suﬃciently
large. Rather than letting this paper get cluttered with statements about how large v must
be at various points, I will just make the blanket assumption here that v is suﬃciently large
so that all consumers are served in the relevant cases and not mention it again.
7The slightly odd-looking assumption that consumers can not visit a store at t = 4 if they have not
visited a store at t = 3 is a device to rule out equilibria in which all consumers wait until t = 4 to shop and
thereby lose the opportunity to switch stores if prices are not as they expect.
63 The Lal-Matutes benchmark: add-ons sold to everyone
have no eﬀect
Although Lal and Matutes (1994) is best-known for its conclusion that multi-product re-
tailers may advertise a single good as a loss leader to save on per product advertising
expenditures, it also contains an irrelevance result about loss-leader pricing – it shows that
the bundle of goods each consumer purchases and the total amount each consumer pays
are exactly the same with loss-leader pricing as they are when all prices were advertised.8
With no advertising costs this results in proﬁts being equal as well. When αh = α`, the
add-on pricing game of this paper is essentially the same as that of Lal and Matutes. In
this section, I verify that the irrelevance result also carries over when αh and α` are a bit
diﬀerent.
Intuitively, the result should not be surprising. When α` and αh are not too diﬀerent,
customers can forecast that they will be held up for the low type’s valuation for the add-on
once they visit the ﬁrm. Hence, it is little diﬀerent from a game where instead of announcing
their prices, ﬁrms announce a number that is exactly $17 below their price. The argument
is virtually identical to that of Lal and Matutes (and tedious) so I will not try to prove
it under the weakest possible assumptions and will only sketch the argument in the text
leaving the details to the appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose α`/αh ≤ 1.6. Write α for (α` + αh)/2. Then for v suﬃciently
large
(a) In any symmetric pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the standard pricing game all
consumers buy the high-quality good from the closest ﬁrm at a price of c + 1/α.
(b) In any symmetric pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the add-on pricing game all
consumers buy the high-quality good from the closest ﬁrm at a price of c + 1/α.
Sketch of Proof
(a) In the standard pricing game, if all consumers buy H at a price of p∗
H, then if ﬁrm
1 deviates to a price p1H in a neighborhood of p∗










8The exact irrelevance result obviously requires special assumptions. Most notably, demands are assumed
to be inelastic up to a cutoﬀ point. I have chosen to make the same assumptions here both because it makes
the model tractable and because it creates the contrast that highlights the competition-softening eﬀect
discussed in the next section.
7A necessary condition for Nash equilibrium is that the derivative of this expression be zero
at p1H = p∗








, which implies that any equilibrium of this
form has p∗
H = c + 1/α.
The proof in the appendix veriﬁes that the various possible nonlocal deviations also
do not increase a ﬁrm’s proﬁts and hence that any proﬁle where each ﬁrm’s prices satisfy
piH = c + 1/α and piL ≥ c + 1/α − w/α` does yield an equilibrium.
The one alternate form of equilibrium that is not implausible is that the ﬁrms might sell
good L to the low types and good H to the high types as part of a “damaged good” second-
degree price discrimination strategy as in Deneckere and McAfee (1996). Damaged goods,
however, are not always useful in price discrimination models. Good L is less valuable, but
no less costly to produce. To get the low types to buy L instead of H, it must be oﬀered at a
substantially lower markup. The appendix shows that for the parameter values considered
here (with α` and αh not too diﬀerent) this makes the damaged good strategy nonviable.
(b) In the add-on pricing model, we can think of the ﬁrm i as advertising a price piL
for good L at t = 1 and then choosing a nonposted price piU ≡ piH − piL for an upgrade
from L to H at t = 2. As in Diamond (1971), the fact that consumers search costs are
sunk when they arrive at the ﬁrm ensures that the ﬁrms will set the monopoly price for
the upgrade in equilibrium. When p1L and p2L are not too diﬀerent and α` and αh are
suﬃciently close together, a monopolist would choose to sell the upgrade to everyone at
a price of w/α`. When p1L is in a neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium price p∗
L,
consumers will correctly anticipate that if they visit ﬁrm j they will end up buying H at a









(p1L + w/α` − c).
The FOC gives that the only possible equilibrium price is p∗
L = c + 1/α − w/α`.
The proof in the appendix again veriﬁes that there is an equilibrium in which ﬁrms
charge this price for the low-quality good and that there are no other symmetric pure-
strategy equilibria.
QED
Note that although everyone buys good H at a price of c + 1/α, the price of good L is
c + 1/α − w/α`. The proposition contains no restrictions on w, so this price can be below
cost. Lal and Matutes (1994) describe their model as a model of loss leaders for this reason.
In Verboven’s (1999) model consumers are horizontally and vertically diﬀerentiated and
the complete irrelevance result of Lal and Matutes does not hold. Low types pay less in
8the add-on pricing game than in the standard pricing game and high types pay more. The
proﬁts part of the irrelevance result nonetheless carries over. The higher price paid by one
group exactly oﬀsets the lower prices paid by the other and the ﬁrms’s proﬁts are identical
in the two games.9
4 Discriminatory add-on pricing softens competition
This section analyzes a more interesting case: the preferences of the high- and low-types are
more diﬀerent so that there is a greater incentive to price discriminate. There are two main
observations. First, the adoption of add-on pricing can soften competition. Second, the
standard pricing game becomes a model of competitive price discrimination with multiple
equilibria. The observations are brought out by comparing the outcomes of the add-on and
standard pricing games for a common set of parameters.
Proposition 2 contains results on the standard pricing game. The equilibrium described
in part (a) illustrates that the standard pricing game becomes a tractable model of com-
petitive price discrimination. The prices at which the two products are sold are those that
would prevail if the ﬁrms were competing in two entirely separate Hotelling markets: one
in which good L is sold to a population of low types; and one in which good H is sold to a
population of high types. The incentive compatibility constraints that play such a crucial
role in monopoly price discrimination models are nonbinding for the range of parameters
under consideration.
Part (b) gives the equilibrium multiplicity result: for a subset of the parameter values
the model also has an equilibrium where the ﬁrms sell the add-on to everyone and don’t
price discriminate. This illustrates a complementarity in practicing price discrimination:
it is optimal for the ﬁrm to discriminate when its rival is discriminating and optimal for
it not to discriminate when its rival is not discriminating. Intuitively, the reason why this
occurs is that it is better to sell the high-quality good to everyone (because it is more highly
valued and no more costly to produce) unless the optimal prices for the high-quality good
in the two populations are very diﬀerent. When a ﬁrm’s rival is charging the same price in
both populations, the ﬁrm’s unconstrained best-response prices will be similar in the two
populations, so it is optimal to choose an in-between price and sell the high-quality good
to everyone. When a ﬁrm’s rival discriminates and charges more to high types, the ﬁrm’s
unconstrained best-response prices are farther apart, and it is optimal to discriminate.
9I thank Frank Verboven for this observation.












Then w > w and for w ∈ (w,w),
(a) The standard pricing game has a “discriminatory” sequential equilibrium in which the
low types buy good L from the closest ﬁrm at a price of c + 1/α` and the high types buy
good H from the closest ﬁrm at a price of c + 1/αh.
(b) If α`/αh > 6.4 (and for some other parameter values) the standard pricing game also
has a sequential equilibrium in which all consumers buy good H from the closest ﬁrm at a
price of c + 1/α. There are no other symmetric pure-strategy equilibria.
Sketch of Proof
(a) When the ﬁrms choose piL = c + 1/α` and piH = c + 1/αh in the standard pric-







= w < w.
After some algebra one can also see that the w < w condition is suﬃcient to ensure that
low types prefer L to H. For small deviations in price it is as if the ﬁrms were playing two
separate competition-on-a-line games: one involving selling good L to low types and one
involving selling good H to high types. The standard calculations for these games show
that a small change in p1L or p1H will not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts.
Completing the proof that this is an equilibrium requires showing that ﬁrm 1 also cannot
increase its proﬁts by selling H to members of both populations. When w is large enough
such a deviation is proﬁtable – good L is suﬃciently damaged so as to make the beneﬁts
from selling the low types a better product outweigh the price discrimination beneﬁts of
selling L. The upper bound w was chosen to ensure that a deviation that involves selling
only H is not proﬁtable. The appendix contains this calculation along with other details
of the argument above.
(b) Any strategy proﬁle with p1H = p2H = c+1/α and piL > c+1/α−w/α` satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization just as it did in Proposition 1. To show that
this is indeed an equilibrium it remains only to show that it is not proﬁtable to make various
nonlocal deviations. The most natural of these is raising the price of good H and selling
good L at a lower price to the low types. The appendix shows that no nonlocal deviations
are proﬁtable when α`/αh is above the bound given in the statement of the Proposition.
Uniform pricing equilibria also exist when α`/αh is smaller provided that w is suﬃciently
large. For some parameter values covered in part (a), however, there is no pure strategy
equilibrium with good H sold to everyone. The appendix also contains a veriﬁcation that
there are no other pure strategy equilibria.
10QED
Remark:
1. I have not tried to state the propositions of this section for the broadest possible
sets of parameter values. The set covered here is suﬃcient to illustrate the observations I
want to bring out and simpliﬁes the algebra. A lower bound close to that given on α`/αh is
necessary for this discriminatory equilibrium – otherwise ﬁrms will be tempted to deviate
and sell good H to everyone. The lower bound w > w ensures that the low type’s incentive
compatibility constraint is nonbinding. The upper bound w < w is used both to ensure
that the high type’s incentive compatibility constraint is nonbinding and to ensure that the
ﬁrms are not tempted to sell good H to everyone.
Proposition 3 characterizes behavior in the add-on pricing game for the same set of
parameter values. Because α` is more than twice as large as αh it is more proﬁtable to sell
the add-on to high types at a price of w/αh than to sell it to everyone at a price of w/α`.
Part (a) describes the equilibrium that seems most reasonable. Part (b) notes another
possibility that one could imagine might also arise in some industries – an expectations
trap in which consumer beliefs that add-ons will be sold at low prices make it impossible
for ﬁrms to charge high prices.
Proposition 3 Suppose α`/αh ∈ [3.2,10] and w ∈ (w,w). Then,
(a) The add-on pricing game has a sequential equilibrium in which the ﬁrms set piL =
c+1/α−w/2α, low types buy good L from the closest ﬁrm, and high types pay w/αh more
to upgrade to good H.
(b) This is the only symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which the equilibrium played at
t = 2 is always that which is optimal for the ﬁrms. The game has other equilibria for some
of the parameter values, including one in which ﬁrms sell good H to everyone at a price of
c + 1/α.
Sketch of Proof
(a) In the add-on pricing game the lower bound on α`/αh ensures that when p1L and
p2L are close together, the best equilibrium for the ﬁrms has both ﬁrms pricing the add-on



















(p1L + w/αh − c)
Considering the ﬁrst-order conditions for ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt maximization shows that piL =
c+1/α−w/2α is the only possible ﬁrst period price in a symmetric pure-strategy equilib-
11rium. This proﬁt function is concave, so no price p1L for which the proﬁt function applies
can increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. It remains only to show that ﬁrm 1 cannot increase its proﬁts
via a larger deviation, for example with a larger reduction in price that will let it sell to
all of the low types (which yields a higher proﬁt than the above formula gives when p1L
is below cost). The assumption that α`/αh < 10 in the proposition is a convenient way
to ensure that the proﬁle is indeed an equilibrium. (Weaker conditions could be given.)
Details are in the appendix.
(b) The uniqueness claim is immediate from the uniqueness of the solution to the ﬁrst-
order condition corresponding to the proﬁt function above.
To see that the nondiscriminatory proﬁle is an equilibrium for some of the parameter
values covered under Proposition 3, note that if consumers’ beliefs are that the ﬁrms set
piL = c + 1/α − w/α` at t = 1 and then set piU = w/α` on the equilibrium path and after
nearby deviations, then if ﬁrm 1 raises its upgrade price at all at t = 2, all low types who
visit will refuse to buy the upgrade and some high types will decide to purchase nothing and


















(c + 1/α − p1H)

(p1H−c).
This is precisely the expression I considered when assessing whether in the standard pricing
game there was any proﬁtable deviation from a proﬁle which sold good H to all consumers
at a price of c+1/α. The fact that that deviaion is not proﬁtable implies that the deviation
under consideration here is not proﬁtable.
QED
Remarks:
1. Good L can easily be sold at a loss in the add-on pricing model. Its price, c+ 1
α − w
2α,
is less than c whenever w > 2. The upper bound w on w in the proposition is greater than




2. The equilibrium multiplicity noted in part (b) is a consequence of the fact that
Diamond’s result about monopoly pricing being the unique equilibrium of the search game
needs a concavity assumption on the proﬁt function. The discrete set of types in my model
yields a nonconvex proﬁt function. I think that the idea that ﬁrms may sometimes be
unable to set high add-on prices because consumers expect not to be held up is intriguing,
but also recognize that the nonconvex proﬁt function it requires may not be reasonable for
many applications.
123. Something I did not discuss explicitly in the proposition is that the add-on game
will typically have many other equilibria with higher and lower payoﬀ levels. The reason
is that one can deter deviations from many ﬁrst period prices by assuming that ﬁrms set
piU = w/αh on the equilibrium path, but revert to the equilibrium with piU = w/α`
following any deviation. These equilibria seem unreasonable.
I now present a few corollaries characterizing proﬁts and welfare. To avoid repeating
lengthy phrases I will refer to the equilibrium of the standard pricing game given in part
(a) of Proposition 2 as the “discriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing game” and
write πs,d for the proﬁts each ﬁrm receives in this equilibrium. I refer to the equilibrium
described in part (b) of Proposition 2 as the “nondiscriminatory equilibrium of the standard
pricing game” and write πs,nd for the proﬁts in it. I refer to the equilibrium described in
part (a) of Proposition 3 as the “add-on pricing equilibrium” and write πa for the proﬁts
in it.
There are two main results on proﬁts. First, the invention of good L can increase proﬁts
even if ﬁrms don’t practice add-on pricing – proﬁts in the discriminatory equilibrium of the
standard pricing game are higher than the proﬁts in the nondiscriminatory equilibrium of
the standard pricing game. Second, the proﬁts in the add-on pricing equilibrium are even
higher.
Corollary 1 Suppose α`/αh ∈ [3.2,10] and w ∈ (w,w). Then,
πa > πs,d > πs,nd
with
πa − πs,d =
α` − αh
4ααh
(w − w), πa − πs,nd =
α` − αh
4ααh














































Taking diﬀerences and simplifying gives the desired results.
QED
One can get some intuition for why proﬁts are higher in the add-on pricing equilibrium
than in the discriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing game by thinking about ﬁrm
1’s best response when ﬁrm 2 sets p2L = c + 1/α` and p2H = c + 1/αh. In the standard
pricing game, ﬁrm 1’s best response is to match these prices. The w > w assumption
is precisely the condition for the upgrade price the ﬁrm charges in the add-on pricing
equilibrium, w/αh, to be greater than 1/αh − 1/α`, i.e. for ﬁrm 1 to be constrained in
the add-on pricing game to choose prices that are farther apart than it would like. Firm 1
would thus choose p1L < p2L and p1H > p2H. Why do average prices increase? Roughly,
prices are reduced less in the small market because cutting prices to the low types is more
costly than increasing prices to the high types. Formally, the best-response prices satisfy
the ﬁrst order condition: dπ1L
dp1L(p1L) = −dπ1H
dp1H (p1H). Approximating the derivatives in a










H(p1H)(p1H − c) + 2Q0
H(p1H)
Q00
L(p1L)(p1L − c) + 2Q0
L(p1L)
In the competition-on-a-line model, ﬁrm-level demand curves are linear, so the Q00 terms
are zero and the fact that the low types’ demand is more price-sensitive implies that p1L
is moved down from p2L less than p1H is moved up from p2H. For more general demand
curves, the calculation suggests that similar results may obtain when demand is convex or
when it concave with |Q00| not too large.
A good way to think about the diﬀerence in proﬁts between the add-on pricing game
and the nondiscriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing game is to regard it as
resulting from the ﬁrms’ having created an adverse-selection problem. In both games ﬁrms
will choose their prices so that the proﬁts earned from the marginal customers attracted
by a dp price cut are exactly oﬀset by the loss of revenue on inframarginal customers. The
revenue loss is identical across games – it is equal to Qdp and in each game each ﬁrm
attracts half of the customers. Hence, the proﬁts on the marginal consumers attracted by
a price cut must also be identical in the two games. The number of consumers attracted
by a small price cut is again identical across games, so per consumer proﬁt on the marginal
consumers is also identical. In the standard pricing game the ﬁrms’ proﬁts on the marginal
14consumers are the same as their proﬁts on the average consumer: ﬁrms make p∗
H − c on
every consumer. In the add-on pricing game the proﬁts on the marginal consumers are
much lower than the proﬁts on the average consumer because of the adverse selection eﬀect
– the marginal consumers attracted by a small price cut are disproportionately low types,
whereas the full customer pool is equally split. Hence, when marginal proﬁts are equal
in the two games, average proﬁts are higher in the add-on pricing game. This intuition
suggests that the πa > πs,nd result may hold under fairly general conditions.
Deneckere and McAfee’s (1996) discussion of damaged goods price discrimination by
monopolies emphasizes that the invention of a damaged good can provide a pareto improve-
ment: inventing and selling good L can increase the surplus of both low- and high-type
consumers (as well as increasing the monopolist’s proﬁts). They mention that in other cases
the more standard welfare tradeoﬀ occurs: price discrimination helps low-type consumers
but hurts the high-type consumers. In the competitive situation considered here the out-
come is diﬀerent: the invention of good L makes both low- and high-type consumers worse
oﬀ.
Corollary 2 Suppose α`/αh ∈ [3.2,10] and w ∈ (w,w). Then,
(a) Both low- and high-type consumers are worse oﬀ in the discriminatory equilibrium
of the standard pricing game than they would be if good L did not exist.
(b) Both low- and high-type consumers are worse oﬀ in the add-on pricing equilibrium
than they would be if good L did not exist.
Proof
When good L does not exist, the model is the standard Hotelling model and all con-
sumers buy good H at p∗
H = c + 1/α.
(a) High types are obviously worse oﬀ in the discriminatory equilibrium because they
pay more for the same good: c + 1/αh > c + 1/α. Low types pay 1/α − 1/α` less in the



























(b) High types are again worse oﬀ because they pay more. Low types pay w/(α` + αh)




1. The view of add-on pricing that consumers should have in light of the equilibrium
eﬀects of add-on pricing are counter to what one often hears from consumer groups. For
example, there was great popular uproar when, in the midst of the electricity crisis of 2001,
some hotel chains started adding a ﬁxed daily energy surcharge to every bill. Proposition
1 suggests that such a fee is irrelevant. High prices for minibar items and in-room movies
seem to be regarded as less outrageous because consumers can avoid paying the high prices
by not consuming the add-ons. The results of this section section, however, indicate that
it is precisely the voluntary nature of such fees that leads to lower consumer surplus.
2. A comparison of the discriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing model and
the add-on pricing equilibrium would reveal the standard welfare tradeoﬀ. Practicing add-
on pricing constrains ﬁrms to charge more for the add-on. Firms react by raising the price
for good H and lowering the price for good L. This helps low types and hurts high types.
5 Why do ﬁrms adopt add-on pricing?
The previous sections examined how the joint adoption of add-on pricing practices aﬀects
proﬁts and consumer surplus. In this section, I turn to the question of whether ﬁrms will
adopt add-on pricing practices.
My ﬁrst observation is that there is something to explain: in the simplest game one can
write down with an endogenous choice of what to advertise, practicing add-on pricing is not
individually rational.10 Speciﬁcally, consider the “endogenous advertising game” in Figure
2. It is a hybrid of the standard- and add-on pricing games in which ﬁrms post as many
prices as they like at t = 1 and then choose the nonposted prices at t = 2. Recall that one
intuition for the higher proﬁts of the add-on pricing equilibrium is that ﬁrms beneﬁt from
a constraint that forces them to keep their low- and high-quality prices farther apart. The
endogenous advertising game removes the constraint. Hence, if a ﬁrm’s rival is playing as
in the the add-on pricing equilibrium, then the ﬁrm will have an incentive to advertise both
prices and move them closer together.
Proposition 4 Suppose α`/αh ∈ [3.2,10] and w ∈ (w,w). Then, the endogenous adver-
tising game does not have an equilibrium in which ﬁrms play as in the add-on pricing
equilibrium.
10This is diﬀerent from what happens in Lal and Matutes (1994), where ﬁrms are indiﬀerent to advertising
one or two prices when there are no per product advertising costs.
16t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Firms post





Consumers see posted prices.
They can visit one ﬁrm at
cost s, see its unposted
prices, and buy L or H.
Consumers who visited a
store at t = 3 may incur s
to visit the other store.
If so, they can buy or not.
The Endogenous Advertising Game
Figure 2: Timeline for the endogenous advertising game
Proof
Suppose that both ﬁrms are playing as in the add-on pricing equilibrium, i.e. both post
piL = p∗
L ≡ c+1/α−w/2α at t = 1 and choose piH = piL+w/αh at t=2 whenever it is the
best continuation equilibrium. Consider a deviation where ﬁrm 1 posts a slightly higher
price for the low-quality good, p1L = p∗
L +  and also posts p1H = p∗
L + w/αh − . For a
suﬃciently small , the unique best-response for ﬁrm 2 at t = 2 is to price its upgrade at
w/αh. Hence, ﬁrm 1’s high-quality price is  less than ﬁrm 2’s. The change in ﬁrm 1’s

































Simplifying and using w > w = (α` − αh)/α` gives
∆π1L = 
(α` + αh) − 2α` + w/α`
4α
> 




(−2αh + w/αh + (α` + αh) − w(α` + αh)
4α
> 
αh − α` + wα`
4α
= 0
Hence, for a small enough  the deviation is proﬁtable. This shows that the proﬁle is not
an equilibrium.
QED
Note that the proposition covers only the parameters for which I previously showed that
the add-on pricing increases proﬁts. It is precisely the fact that add-on pricing acts as a
constraint on pricing that makes it not individually rational. In the situation considered
in Proposition 1, in which whether ﬁrms practice add-on pricing is irrelevant, there are
equilibria in which ﬁrms do and do not practice add-on pricing.
17Proposition 4 shows that there is always a proﬁtable deviation from the add-on pricing
equilibrium. It is worth noting, however, that the deviation may not dramatically increase
profts. The reason is that undercutting a nonposted price can be more diﬃcult than
undercutting a posted price. Consider, for example, the add-on pricing model with α`/αh =
3 and w = 10/3. The add-on pricing equilibrium has p∗
L = c − 1/α` and p∗
H = c + 3/αh.
If ﬁrm 2 was committed to these prices and ﬁrm 1 was capable of posting two prices at
t = 1, its optimal deviation would be to dump all the unproﬁtable low types on the other
ﬁrm and steal all of the high types by setting p1L ≥ c and p1H = c + 2/αh. In the add-on
pricing model, however, this doesn’t work. There is no continuation equilibrium in which
p2H = p2L + w/αh and ﬁrm 1 gets all the high types because in that case ﬁrm 2 would be
visited exclusively by low types and would therefore deviate at t = 2 to p2H = p2L +w/α`.
It turns out that the only pure-strategy equilibrium of the continuation game is for ﬁrm 2
to set p2H = p2L + w/α` at t = 2. At this price, ﬁrm 2 sells to all of the low types and all
of the high types, and ﬁrm 1’s large deviation ends up yielding it zero proﬁts. In the proof
of Proposition 4 I avoided this problem by considering only  deviations. Noninﬁnitesimal
deviations are also possible, but ﬁrm 1 does need to be sure to leave its rival with enough
high types so that it remains an equilibrium for ﬁrm 2 to choose a high add-on price at
t = 2. (In this example it must ensure that q2H ≥ q2L/2.) This limits the gains to deviating.
How can one account for the use of add-on pricing strategies? My view is that this is
a practically important question, but not one I should dwell on in this paper. There are
a number of ways in which I could modify the endogenous advertising model to provide
an explanation for why add-on pricing occurs without aﬀecting my conclusions about the
eﬀects of add-on pricing. Some of the explanations are fairly standard and some are less so.
In each case, however, the arguments seem suﬃciently straightforward so that discussing
them verbally in a paragraph or two probably conveys most of the insights one would get
from a longer formal development.
I will now brieﬂy discuss four of these.
1. Per-product advertising costs
Lal and Matutes (1994) ﬁrst pointed out that per-product advertising costs can provide
a reason to advertise one good as a loss leader and leave other prices unadvertised. The
same argument applies in my similar model. If the incremental cost of advertising the price
of a second product is greater than the amount that a ﬁrm can gain by choosing a somewhat
lower price for good H and a somewhat higher price for good L, then it will be individually
rational for the ﬁrms to advertise just one price.
18To make this a complete explanation for add-on pricing, one must also argue that ﬁrms
cannot proﬁtably deviate by posting a price for good H instead of a price for good L. If a
ﬁrm only posts a price for good H at t = 1, then it will only sell good H in equilibrium.
(The ﬁrm cannot set a price for good L that makes positive sales because the ﬁrm will
always want to deviate and increase its good L price slightly given the search costs.) If
ﬁrm 1 deviates from the add-on pricing equilibrium and sells good H to both populations,








































This expression is maximized at p1H = c + 1/α + w/4α, with the maximized value being
(1 + w/4)2/α. For the parameter values considered in section 4, this is less than the
equilibrium proﬁt. Hence, per-product advertising costs can provide a complete explanation
for why ﬁrms practice add-on pricing.
The prices given in Proposition 3 are an equilibrium of the add-on pricing game for a
larger set of parameter values than is covered by the hypotheses of the proposition. For
some of these (e.g. when w is very large) the prices would fail to be an equilibrium of the
endogenous advertising game because the ﬁrms would want to deviate and advertise good
H instead.
2. Advertising costs determined by consumer search patterns
In many industries it would be prohibitively expensive to inform potential customers of
a product’s price by advertising in the traditional sense. Hotels and car rental agencies, for
example, serve consumers from all over the country and sell goods at many diﬀerent prices.
Avis would be crazy to conduct a nationonwide media campaign to tell a few potential
consumers that the rate for a three-day rental of a Pontiac Grand Am at the Detroit
airport on August 2, 2002 is $74.97. Instead, consumers learn about prices by looking for
prices that ﬁrms have posted.
In such an environment ﬁrms can only practically inform consumers of prices that the
consumers are looking for. Each of the main internet travel websites, for example, is only
designed to let consumers search for the base price for a rental, not for the price of a
rental including insurance, prepaid gasoline, and other add-on charges. Looking only at
low-quality prices can be perfectly rational for consumers if there is no dispersion in add-on
19prices. If most consumers only look for prices for good L, add-on pricing will be individually
rational for ﬁrms also. Cutting the price of good H lowers the ﬁrm’s margin on all good H
sales and does not attract consumers who only look for good L prices.
This is a multiple equilibrium explanation. Practicing add-on pricing is an equilibrium,
but it would also be an equilibrium for ﬁrms not to practice add-on pricing.
3. Exploitation of boundedly rational consumers
I mentioned earlier that the add-on pricing model can be given a “behavioral” interpre-
tation: some or all of the high types could be unsophisticated consumers who are not as
good at making price comparisons across ﬁrms and who are also easier to talk into buying
add-ons at the point-of-sale. For example, they might be people who don’t always compare
prices from competing rental car companies before making a reservation and who also don’t
think in advance about the fact that they will be oﬀered rental car insurance at the counter.
One reason why ﬁrms adopt add-on pricing policies may be that they somehow “trick”
unsophisticated consumers into paying more than they would if the ﬁrms advertised their
add-on prices. For example, suppose Hertz decided to augment its traditional advertisement
of a $97 weekly rental rate in Florida with a note saying that it was making full insurance
available at a small discount oﬀ its current $244 weekly rate. It seems plausible that this
could reduce the proﬁts Hertz earns on unsophisticated consumers via several mechanisms:
some customers who make a bad decision to buy the insurance when under time pressure
might make a better decision if they thought about it in advance; some customers might be
spurred to gather information and learn that the insurance is largely unnecessary given the
coverage they have through their regular auto insurance policy; and some customers might
have decided to make other plans and not rent a car if they been confronted with the total
cost of a rental plus insurance in advance .
A simple modiﬁcation to the endogenous advertising model that can make add-on pric-
ing individually rational is to assume that a fraction of the high types are unsophisticated
consumers who will buy good H if it is presented to them as add-ons are, but who will not
buy good H if advertising informs them about its price in advance. This would make add-
on pricing individually rational if the gain from bringing low- and high-quality prices closer
together is more than oﬀset by losses that would result from not tricking unsophisticated
consumers. In light of the diﬃculty of undercutting a nonposted price noted above, it may
suﬃce to assume that a relatively small fraction of consumers are irrational types who are
tricked by add-on pricing.
204. Tacit collusion
The main conclusion of Section 4 was that the joint adoption of add-on pricing policies
increases proﬁts. This makes it possible to apply another standard explanation for why
ﬁrms might practice add-on pricing: tacit collusion. To complete this story, one would want
to explain why ﬁrms only collude on using add-on pricing rather than colluding directly
on prices. Colluding on price would be more proﬁtable, so this requires arguing that
colluding on using add-on pricing is somehow easier than colluding on price. Colluding
on the monopoly price can be diﬃcult for many reasons: ﬁrms need to coordinate on
changing prices in response to cost or demand shocks; ﬁrms may prefer diﬀerent prices; and
monitoring deviations from optimal pricing may be diﬃcult if (as presumably happens with
hotels, rental cars, etc.) the optimal pricing policy involves dynamically changing prices in
response to privately known cost shocks and capacity constraints. A tacit agreement to use
add-on pricing avoids all of the complexity, coordination, and monitoring issues: the ﬁrms
just need to agree to and monitor that no one is advertising the price of good H.
To make this story more convincing, one would also want to argue not just that full
collusion is impossible, but also that there aren’t easy strategies for colluding on prices that
are less than fully collusive but still are more proﬁtable than the equilibrium prices in the
add-on pricing game. See Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) for a discussion of partially
collusive pricing schemes in a model where ﬁrms have private information.
This, again, is a multiple equilibrium story.
6 The cheapskate externality
How do cheapskates aﬀect markets? The question may be current interest given that the
internet makes it much easier for cheapskates to ﬁnd and exploit small price diﬀerences. The
standard answer would be that cheapskates play an important role in keeping prices near
cost. Frankel (1998), for example, proposes that the desire to live where budget-conscious
consumers keep prices low may be one reason why wealthy and poor households are often
found in close proximity in the U.S. In this section, I note that the traditional view of
cheapskates is turned on its head in the add-on pricing model.
The model of this section is a slight variant of the previous add-on pricing model that I
will refer to as the “cheapskate model”. The only diﬀerences are that I assume that there
is only an  mass of cheapskates (rather than a unit mass) and that I will focus on what
happens when α` is much larger than αh.
Proposition 5 contrasts the outcome of the cheapskate version of the add-on pricing
21game with what would happen if ﬁrms were selling a single good to the same population.
Part (a) illustrates that the ordinary intuition about the eﬀects of cheapskates on other
consumers and on ﬁrms is borne out in a one-good model, which can be obtained as a
special case of the cheapskate model by assuming that w = 0. Part (b) notes that the
ordinary comparative statics are reversed in the cheapskate model when w is large enough
to act as a constraint forcing ﬁrms to keep prices for good L and H apart.11 One can
thus think of add-on pricing as a clever competitive strategy that ﬁrms can use to turn
the presence of cheapskates from a curse into a blessing. At the same time the presence of
cheapskates reduces the utility of normal consumers.
The intuition for the contrast is that whereas ﬁrms in the one-good model are tempted
to slightly undercut each other to attract cheapskates, ﬁrms in the add-on pricing model
are tempted to slightly overcut each other. When w is large, ﬁrms are losing money on the
cheapskates and would like to dump all of their cheapskate customers on the other ﬁrm.
When w is not quite so large, the ﬁrms earn postive proﬁts on the cheapskates. However,
if they were to leave the high price unchanged and sell L at c + 1/αh − w/αh, they would
be selling L for less than c + 1/α` and hence would prefer to serve fewer cheapskates at a
higher margin.
Proposition 5 Suppose α`/αh > 2. Deﬁne α ≡ αh+α`
1+ .
(a) In the one-good version of the cheapskate model obtained by setting w = 0, for suﬃ-
ciently small  the unique symmetric equilibrium has p∗ = c + 1/α, and prices and proﬁts
are decreasing in .
(b) If w > w, then for suﬃciently small  the unique symmetric equilibrium of the cheapskate
version of the add-on pricing model has
p∗


















and proﬁts and the price paid by high types are increasing in .
Proof











The ﬁrst order condition for maximizing this implies that the only possible symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium is p∗ = c + 1/α. To verify that this is indeed an equilibrium
11As in Propositions 2 and 3 the requirement is that the upgrade price w/αh be larger than what the
diﬀerence between pH and pL would be if the ﬁrms competed separately for the low and high types.
22one must also check that ﬁrm 1 cannot proﬁtably deviate to a higher price at which it
serves no low types. The price that maximizes ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts from sales to high types
is p1 = c + 1
2α + 1








One can show that this is less than the equilibrium proﬁt level for suﬃciently small  by
evaluating the derivatives of this expression and the expression for the equilibrium proﬁts
with respect to  at  = 0. Intuitively, if the ﬁrm abandons the low market it gives up a
potential proﬁt that is ﬁrst-order in , whereas the proﬁts that a ﬁrm sacriﬁces in the high
market when it also serves the low types are second-order in  by the envelope theorem
(because the price is approaching the optimal price in the high submarket).
The expression for the equilibrium price is clearly decreasing in . Equilibrium proﬁts
are given by
(1+)2
αh+α`. Evaluating the derivative of this expression with respect to  at  = 0
shows that proﬁts are decreasing in  in a neighborhood of  = 0 if α` > 2αh.
(b) Let p∗
L be the price set at t = 1 in a pure strategy equilibrium. When  is small
both ﬁrms will set piH = piL + w/αh at t = 2 whenever the ﬁrst period prices are in some
neighborhood of p∗
























The fact that any equilibrium price p∗
L must be a solution to the ﬁrst order condition for
maximizing this expression gives that the only possible equilibrium is to have p∗
L equal to
w/αh less than the expression given in the statement of the proposition. The expression
for p∗





























The coeﬃcient on  in this expression is positive when w = w = αh(1/αh − 1/α`), and the
coeﬃcient is increasing in w. Hence, for all w satisfying the hypothesis of part (b), proﬁts
are increasing in  when  is small.
To complete the proof of part (b), it remains only to show that the prices derived above
are an equilibrium and not just the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition. Deviating to a
higher price cannot be proﬁtable. The concave proﬁt function above applies as long as sales
to the low types are nonzero. Hence ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts decline as it raises its price from p∗
L to
p∗
L +1/α`. Any price increases beyond that point would further decrease proﬁts as proﬁts,
since proﬁts from sales to the high types are decreasing in p1L at p∗
L and all higher prices.
23No deviation to a lower price will be proﬁtable if ﬁrm 1 makes positive sales to the low
types at the price which maximizes its proﬁts on sales to the high types (by the concavity
of the proﬁt function). The diﬀerence between p∗
H and the price that maximizes proﬁts
from sales to the high types (setting p1H = 1
2(p∗
H + c + 1/αh)) is of order . Hence for 




This paper is related to several literatures. One is the literature on loss leaders in multigood
settings. It focuses on the question of why ﬁrms set low prices for some goods and high
prices for others. Holton (1957) is the seminal paper here. It notes that “The margin
sacriﬁced on the loss leader is, of course, a promotion expense incurred to boost the sales of
the other products of the store” and argues that high margins on the “other” products can
be rationalized because “the supermarket enjoys a spatial monopoly on that item once the
consumer is in the store.” Lal and Matutes (1994) formalizes Holton’s argument. It uses a
Hotelling model of diﬀerentiation and models ex post monopoly power with a mechanism
like that of Diamond (1971). Verboven (1999) is another formalization in which the same
thing – high prices for add-ons – happens for the same reason. Its model has both vertical
and horizontal consumer heterogeneity, but the increased similarity to this paper is more
apparent than substantive. Verboven does not consider the possiblity of vertical tastes being
correlated with the strength of horizontal preferences, which is the driving force behind my
results. Subsequent to my work, Gabaix and Laibson (2004) have developed a behavioral
model of add-on pricing that proceeds very much along the lines of the third model I
sketched in section 5. The tradeoﬀ that determines whether add-on pricing is individually
rational in their model is similar to what I describe in section 5, albeit with one diﬀerence
due to their assuming that ﬁrms engage in Bertrand competition – the loss from not tricking
unsophisticated consumers must be larger than the improvement in eﬃciency that a ﬁrm
could generate (and extract from the homogeneous rational consumers) by pricing add-ons
at cost. Like the earlier papers, Gabaix and Laibson do not address the impact of add-on
pricing on proﬁts: in their Bertrand model ﬁrms receive zero proﬁts regardless of how they
advertise.
24This paper also belongs to the broader literature on competitive price discrimination.12
Much of this literature examines third-degree discrimination. Holmes (1989) provides some
of the most basic results: when duopolists compete in two separate markets banning price
discrimination will lower prices in one market and raise them in the other; the the net
eﬀect on proﬁts is ambiguous. One paper with a result superﬁcially similar to mine is
Corts (1998), which emphasizes that price discrimination can lead to reduced proﬁts in all
markets, but also shows that price discrimination can lead to higher prices in all markets.
The papers are not closely related, however. Corts’ model is of third degree discrimination
and relies on strong asymmetries to generate the uniformly price changes. Indeed, he shows
that banning price discrimination always helps one group of consumers and hurts the other
unless the groups or ﬁrms are suﬃciently asymmetric so that one ﬁrm wants to price high
to the ﬁrst group and the other ﬁrm wants to price high to the second group. There are few
papers on competitive second-degree discrimination that analyze models with vertical and
horizontal diﬀerentiation, no doubt because it can be diﬃcult to construct models that are
suﬃciently tractable to allow closed form solutions. Two notable exceptions are Armstrong
and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002). Among other contributions, each of these
paper derives a nondiscrimination theorem. They show that when brand preferences are of
the type generally assumed in discrete-choice models and brand preferences are independent
of consumers’ valuations for quality, then the outcome of the competitive second degree
price discrimination model is that ﬁrms don’t use quality levels to discriminate: all quality
levels are oﬀered at the same dollar markup over cost. As a contribution to this literature,
my paper can be seen as examining what happens when the intensity of consumers’ brand
preference is correlated with their willingness to pay for higher quality. The result on price
discrimination being self-reinforcing is another contribution.
Another related literature is the literature on switching costs.13 Although the early
switching cost papers stressed applications where consumers buy the same product in mul-
tiple periods, many arguments are equally applicable to situations where the product pur-
chased in the second period is diﬀerent from the product bought in the ﬁrst period. For
example, Klemperer’s (1987a) discussion of situations where proﬁts with inﬁnite switch-
ing costs are identical to proﬁts with no switching costs is essentially the same as Lal and
Matutes’ irrelevance result, and a number of papers have used similar frameworks to discuss
market power in aftermarket service, e.g. Shapiro (1995) and Borenstein, MacKie-Mason,
12Stole (2004) provides an excellent survey.
13Farrell and Klemperer (2004) provides an excellent survey.
25and Netz (2000). The most basic result in the switching cost literature is that switching
costs can increase or decrease proﬁts because they usually make ﬁrst period prices (think
base goods) lower and second-period prices (add-ons) higher. The literature contains sev-
eral well known arguments about why switching costs may tend to raise proﬁts, for example
Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Klemperer (1987b), Beggs and Klemperer (1992). These, how-
ever, are fairly diﬀerent from the argument made here. In particular, the arguments in the
above papers are all inapplicable to add-ons because they require an assumption that ﬁrms
cannot diﬀerentiate between new and old customers, i.e. that the ﬁrm cannot choose an
add-on price diﬀerent from the price for good L. As a contribution to this literature, my
paper can be seen as presenting a new argument for why switching costs may tend to raise
proﬁts in situations where ﬁrms can distinguish between old and new consumers. It also
runs counter to some of the aftermarkets literature in that it provides an argument for why
it might be advantageous to mandate that aftermarket service contracts must be bundled
with base goods.
There are also other papers on loss-leaders that take very diﬀerent approaches. Simester
(1995) provides a signalling explanation for loss leaders in a model where retailers have het-
erogeneous costs. Lazear (1995) develops a monopoly model of bait-and-switch advertising.
Hess and Gerstner (1987) develop a model in which ﬁrms sometimes stock out on advertised
products and oﬀer rain checks because consumers buy “impulse goods” whenever they visit
a store to buy an advertised product.
This paper is also loosely related related to all papers discussing a strategic investments
that softens competition. Chapter 8 of Tirole (1988) reviews a number of such papers. A
classic example is Thisse and Vives (1988), which notes that ﬁrms are better oﬀ competing
in FOB prices than in delivered prices, because when they choose separate delivered prices
for each location they end up being in Bertrand competition for the consumers at each
location. As in this paper, they also note that FOB pricing is not individually rational in
an extended game in which ﬁrms ﬁrst choose pricing policies, and then compete in prices.
The one very closely related empirical paper is Ellison and Ellison (2004), which analyzes
demand and markups at a retailer using an add-on strategy when selling computer parts
on the internet. Its provides evidence in support of this paper in two ways: it provides
evidence that this paper’s assumptions about demand reﬂect reality in at least one market;
and it provides evidence in support of this paper’s conclusions. The evidence relevant to
the assumptions are estimates of how the demand for products of several quality levels
depends on the prices of all of the other qualities. Speciﬁcally, loss leaders are shown to
26attract a large number of customers who end up buying upgraded products at higher price,
and there is evidence of the adverse selection eﬀect – the customer pool of attracted by a
low-priced loss leader is shown to have a much higher percentage of customers who do not
upgrade. Supporting evidence for the conclusion that add-on pricing softens competition
comes from a straightforward analysis of price and cost data. The ﬁrm is estimated to
earn average markups over marginal cost of about ten to ﬁfteen percent even though the
elasticity of demand for the base goods is between -25 and -40.
There is surprisingly little other empirical evidence on loss-leader pricing. The one
standard empirical reference in marketing seems to be Walters (1988). It examines the
impact of loss leaders on store traﬃc by estimating a system of simultaneous equations.
The key equation essentially regresses the total number of customers visiting a supermarket
in a week on dummy variables for whether a product in each of eight categories is featured
in a sales circular and oﬀered at a discount of at least 15%. Walters ﬁnds little evidence
that loss leaders aﬀect store traﬃc. Chevalier, Rossi, and Scharfstein (2003) use data
from a Chicago supermarket chain to examine the pricing and demand for products that
have large seasonal peaks in demand. Several ﬁndings are consistent with these products
serving as loss leaders: the retail margin of a product tends to decline during the period
of its peak demand even if this does not coincide with a peak in aggregate supermarket
demand; aggregate margins do not decrease during aggregate demand peaks; reductions in
item prices during product-speciﬁc demand peaks do not appear to be due to changes in
demand elasticities; and reductions in item prices during product-speciﬁc demand peaks are
associated with increases in product-speciﬁc advertising. Verboven (1999) uses a hedonic
regression to compare markups for base model cars and cars with more powerful engines
and ﬁnds that percentage markups on the premium engines are higher in some car classes
but not in others.
8 Conclusion
The add-on pricing strategy described in this paper could be practiced in almost any busi-
ness. Firms just need to be able to invent a lower-quality versions of their products; the
lower-quality products need not be any cheaper to produce. The key feature of the con-
sumer pool is that consumers who are more sensitive to inter-ﬁrm price diﬀerences are
less likely to purchase costly add-ons. This seems plausible given a number of sources of
heterogeneity, e.g. rich versus poor consumers, individual versus business customers, or
sophisticated versus unsophisticated shoppers.
27The general idea of creating intentionally creating an adverse selection problem to limit
competition is perhaps also one that could be applied in contexts other than pricing games.
For ﬁrms the main consequence of add-on pricing is that proﬁts are higher than they
otherwise would be given the degree of product diﬀerentiation. This eﬀect may be generally
important to our understanding of how ﬁrms maintain suﬃcient markups to survive in a
world where ﬁxed costs are often substantial. In the long run, of course, entry would be
expected to reduce the degree of diﬀerentiation between adjacent ﬁrms and bring proﬁts
into line with ﬁxed costs. What add-on pricing may help us understand is thus why we
observe so many ﬁrms in various industries.
I have not discussed social welfare extensively. Models like mine with unit demands
are poorly suited to welfare analyses. For example, social welfare in the add-on pricing
model is identical to that in the discriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing model
– in both models all low types by one unit of L and all high types buy one unit of H. In
a more realistic setup, the lower price for good L would increase consumption of L and
the higher price for the add-on would reduce consumption of H. How the losses and gains
would trade oﬀ is not clear.14 The welfare comparison between the add-on pricing model
and the one-good model obtained by eliminating good L may be more straightforward. I
noted that both the high and low types pay more relative to their valuation in the add-on
pricing game than in the one-good model. If this is also true in a model with continuous
aggregate demand functions, deadweight loss would presumably be unambiguously larger
in the add-on model. (Welfare is unambiuously lower in the add-on pricing game with unit
demands because it is ineﬃcient for the low types to buy L rather than H.)
14See, for example, Klemperer (1987a) and Borenstein, MacKie-Mason, and Netz (2000).
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30Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) Consider ﬁrst the possibility of a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium where
all consumers buy good H at a price of p∗
H. This requires that piL ≥ p∗
H − w/α`. If ﬁrm 1
deviates to a price p1H in a neighborhood of p∗
H (and raises p1L at the same time if need










A necessary condition for Nash equilibrium is that the derivative of this expression be
zero at p1H = p∗








, which implies that the only possible
equilibrium of this form is p1H = p2H = p∗
H = c + 1/α.
To show that it is indeed a SPE for both ﬁrms to set piH = c + 1/α and piL ≥
c+1/α−w/α` (with all consumers buying good H from the closest ﬁrm) requires that we
check that various possible deviations do not increase a ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
Consider ﬁrst a deviation to prices p1L and p1H at which consumers only buy good H.
To show that such a deviation cannot increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts I’ll make a few observations
in succession.
Observation 1: If ﬁrm 1 sells good H to some but not all consumers in each population
then the deviation does not increase proﬁts.
To see this, note that in this case the formula above gives ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. The expression
is a quadratic in p1H and hence the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition is the maximum.
Observation 2: If ﬁrm 1 sells good H to everyone in the cheapskate population then the
deviation does not increase proﬁts.
With such prices, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are smaller than what one gets from plugging p1H into
the proﬁt formula above, which in turn is smaller than the proﬁts from setting p1H = p∗
H.
Observation 3: If ﬁrm 1 makes no sales in the cheapskate population then the deviation is
not proﬁtable.
If ﬁrm 1 chooses p1H > p∗













Taking the ﬁrst order condition we see that the global maximum of this expression occurs
at





















A straightforward calculation shows that this is the case if α`/αh ≤ (3 +
√
17)/2 ≈ 3.562,
which is true given the assumption of the Proposition. Hence, we can conclude that the
proﬁts from any price that sells only to the high types are at most equal to the proﬁts
received from the high types by setting p1H = c + 1
2αh + 1
2α, which in turn is less than the
proﬁts received from setting this price and selling to members of both populations, which
by observation 1 are less than what ﬁrm 1 receives by setting p1H = p∗
H.
Taken together, observations 1-3 imply that any deviation which involves only selling
good H is not proﬁtable: if ﬁrm 1 deviates to p1H < p∗
H then ﬁrm 1 makes more sales to
cheapskates than to high types so either observation 1 or observation 2 applies; if ﬁrm 1
deviates to p1H > p∗
H then ﬁrm 1 makes more sales to high types than to cheapskates and
observation 1 or observation 3 applies.
Observation 4: Any deviation to prices p1L and p1H at which ﬁrm 1 sells only good L is
not proﬁtable.
To see this, note that ﬁrm 1 would sell at least as many units (and get a higher price
on each at no higher cost) by setting prices p0
1L = ∞ and p0
1H = p1L+w/α`. We’ve already
shown these prices do not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt.
Finally, consider a deviation to prices p1L and p1H at which ﬁrm 1 sells good L to the
cheapskates and good H to the high types. If there were no IC constraints so ﬁrm 1 could
simply choose the optimal prices in each population its choices would be p1H = c+ 1
2α + 1
2αh
and p1L = c + 1
2α + 1−w
2α` . If w < α`−αh
2α`−αh, however, these prices would lead the high types
to buy good L. If w > α`−αh
αh , these prices would lead the low types to buy good H.
Accordingly, I will consider separately the optimal deviation of this form when w is small
(with the high type’s IC constrait binds), intermediate, and high (with the low type’s IC
constraint binding). I do this by presenting an additional series of observations.
Observation 5: If w ≤ α`−αh
2α`−αh then a deviation that sells L to the low types and H to the
high types is not proﬁtable.




































1(w) = maxp1H π1(p1H,w) and write p∗
1H for the price that maximizes this expression.
The maximum proﬁt achievable by a deviation of this form is at most πd
1(w) as long as the
32best possible deviation of this form has p1H −w/αh ≥ c. (In the opposite case the deviation
can’t increase proﬁts because ﬁrm 1 would be better oﬀ not selling good L and we have
already seen that such deviations do not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts.) From the envelope





















To show that πd





it suﬃces to show that the derivative is
negative for all w in the interval. For this it suﬃces to show that
(2α` − αh)(p∗
1H(w) − c) < 1 + α`/α.
If the high type’s IC constraint were not binding ﬁrm 1 would choose p1H = c + 1
2α + 1
2αh.
Given the constraint the optimal p∗
1H(w) will be smaller. Plugging this upper bound into












Mulitplying through and collecting terms this is equivalent to
2α2
` − α`αh − 5α2
h < 0,
which holds provided that α`/αh < (1 +
√
41)/4 ≈ 1.851.
Observation 6: If α`−αh
2α`−αh ≤ w ≤ α`−αh
αh then a deviation that sells L to the low types
and H to the high types is not proﬁtable.
In this case, the IC constraints are not binding and the optimal deviation of this form
is to p1L = c+ 1
2α + 1−w
2α` and p1H = c+ 1
2α + 1
2αh. With these prices proﬁts from high type
consumers are independent of w and proﬁts from low type consumers are decreasing in w.
To see that the deviation is not proﬁtable for any w in the interval it therefore suﬃces to
show that the deviation is not proﬁtable when w = α`−αh
2α`−αh. This follows from observation
5.
Observation 7: If α`−αh
αh ≤ w then a deviation that sells L to the low types and H to
the high types is not proﬁtable.
In this case, the IC constraint of the low type is binding. The optimal deviation of
this type has p1L = p1H − w/α`. This can not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts, because the type L
consumers would also be willing to buy good H at price p1H. Hence, ﬁrm 1 could do better
selling only good H and we have already seen that there is no proﬁtable deviation of this
form.
33This concludes the argument to show that there are subgame perfect equilibria with
p2H = p2H = c + 1/α, piL > c + 1/α − w/α` and all consumers buying H from the closest
ﬁrm at t = 3.
To prove the uniqueness claim of part (a), we must also show that there are no other
symmetric pure strategy equilibria in the standard pricing game. It is obvious that there
are no equilibria in which all consumers buy good L. A ﬁrm could increase its proﬁts by
setting p0
1L = ∞ and p0
iH = min(c,piL+w/α`). There are no equilibria where the low types
buy good H and high types buy good L because the high types will strictly prefer to buy
H whenever the low types weakly prefer H.
The ﬁnal more serious possibility to consider is whether there is an equilibrium in which
low types buy good L and high types buy good H. We can think of three possible cases:
equilibria where low types and high types both strictly prefer to purchase the good they
are purchasing, those where the high types are indiﬀerent to buying good L, and those
where the low types are indiﬀerent to buying good H. The last of the three cases is not
possible — each ﬁrm could increase its proﬁts by not oﬀering good L (because its low type
consumers would buy H instead at the higher price). I will ﬁrst discuss the ﬁrst case.
In a discriminatory equilibrium where low types strictly prefer good L and high types
strictly prefer good H the ﬁrst order conditions for each ﬁrm’s proﬁts imply that the only
possible equilibrium is p1L = p2L = c + 1/α` and p1H = p2H = c + 1/αh. Low types prefer
good L at these prices only if piL < piH −w/α`. This requires w ≤ α`−αh
αh . High types prefer
good H at these prices only if piL > piH −w/αh. This requires w ≥ α`−αh
α` . Assume that w
does satisfy these conditions.
Suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates to p0
1L = ∞ and p0
1H = c + 1
α + w
4α. One can verify that
p0
1H > p2H−1/αh and p0
1H > p2L+w/α`−1/α` whenever α`/αh < (3+
√
17)/2. Hence, after
the deviation ﬁrm 1 sells to a subset of each population and ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are bounded
below by the standard expression for proﬁts in a competition-on-a-line model. Omitting





















































































The ﬁnal analysis necessary to complete the proof of part (a) is a demonstration that
there are also no discriminatory equilibria with piL = piH − w/αh with the parameter
restrictions of part (a). Firm 1 could deviate from such an equilibrium by raising or lowering
p1L and changing p1H by exactly the same amount (i.e., setting p1H = p1L + w/αh). For a
small enough change in prices ﬁrm 1 would continue to sell L to a fraction of the low types



















(p1L + w/αh − c).
Considering the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing this expression we can see that the
only possible SPE of this form would have p1L = c + 1/α − w/2α (and p1H = c + 1/α −
w/2α+w/αh.) Given the restriction on α`/αh in the proposition it turns out that there is
always a proﬁtable deviation from this proﬁle.
If w > (α`−αh)/α` a proﬁtable deviation is to raise p1L by a small amount and leave p1H
unchanged. With such a deviation proﬁts from sales to the high types will be unchanged
and ﬁrm 1 will sell fewer units of good L to low types (at a higher price). This is proﬁtable
























which is positive for w > (α` − αh)/α`.
When w ≤ (α` −αh)/α` a proﬁtable deviation is to simply raise p1L suﬃciently high so
that the low types will prefer to buy good H. Firm 1 will sell fewer units with this strategy,
35but at a higher price. Proﬁts from the high types are unchanged. Proﬁts from sales to the
low types change from 1





































Substituting in the upper bound (α` − αh)/α` for the second w in this expression and







which is positive for α`/αh < 2. This completes the proof that there is no equilibrium in
which the ﬁrms make sales of good L and thereby completes the proof of part (a) of the
proposition.
(b) To analyze the add-on pricing game , I begin with a lemma noting that if the ﬁrms’
ﬁrst period prices are close together, then at t = 2 the ﬁrms will sell the “upgrade” to all
consumers at a price of w/α`.
Lemma 1 Assume α`/αh ≤ 1.6. Suppose that at t = 1 the ﬁrms choose prices p1L and p2L
with |p2L−p1L| ≤ 2αh−α`
α2
h
and c < piL < (v−w−s−1/2)/α`. Then, the unique equilibrium
of the subgame at t = 2 has the ﬁrms selling the upgrade to all consumers at a price of
w/α`.
A proof of the lemma is presented immediately after the proof of this Proposition. Given
the result of the lemma, we know that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt following a small deviation at t = 1
from the symmetric proﬁle p1L = p2L = p∗




















Considering the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing this expression shows that the only
possible ﬁrst period price in a symmetric SPE is p∗
L = c + 1/α − w/α`. By Lemma 1, at
t=2 both ﬁrms must set piH = c + 1/α − w/α` + w/α` = c + 1/α on the equilibrium path,
and all consumers must buy good H from the nearest ﬁrm. This completes the proof of
the uniqueness part of part (b) of the proposition.
To verify that there is indeed a pure strategy SPE of the form described, suppose that
both ﬁrms set piL = c + 1/α − w/α` at t = 1 and follow some SPE strategy at t = 2 and
36that consumers behave optimally given the ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies and purchase good
H if they are indiﬀerent between buying H and L.
By deﬁnition we know that ﬁrm 1 has no proﬁtable deviation at t = 2.
To show that there is no proﬁtable deviation at t = 1, I will present a series of observa-
tions covering various cases.






With such a deviation, Lemma 1 implies that ﬁrm 2 sets p2H = c + 1/α at t = 2. Part
(a) of the proposition implies that no matter what prices p1L and p1H ﬁrm 1 chooses it
cannot earn a proﬁt in excess of 1/α when p2H = c + 1/α. This includes the prices ﬁrm 1
is charging after a deviation here.






In this case, regardless of what prices are chosen at t = 2 ﬁrm 1 will sell at least as
many units of good L as of good H. Hence, its proﬁts are bounded above by the proﬁts
from selling the same number of units at a price of p1L + w/α`. If p1L + w/α` < 0 then
these proﬁts are negative and not a proﬁtable deviation. If p1L + w/α` > 0 then proﬁts
are bounded above by the proﬁts ﬁrm 1 would receive from selling to all consumers at this














































In this case, ﬁrm 2 will make at least as many sales to low types as to high types. Hence,
p2H = p2L +w/α` = c+1/α. Again, part (a) of the proposition implies that the prices p1L
and p1H ﬁrm 1 ends up charging cannot increase its proﬁts.
QED
Proof of Lemma 1 To see that p1U = p2U = w/α` is an equilibrium, note that when the
ﬁrms are expected to set the same upgrade price, the mass of group j customers visiting
37ﬁrm 1 is 1
2 +
αj












(p1L − c + w/α`).
Deviating to a lower upgrade price obviously cannot increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts – the lower
price will not lead to any extra sales.





2 (p2L − p1L)

w
α`. Firm 1’s sales to high types will be no higher.
The upgrade price paid by these customers can be at most w/αh. Hence the increase in










. The change in
























































The bound on |p2L − p1L| assumed in the lemma ensures that this is negative.
I now show that this is the only equilibrium.
First, note that the upper bound on the prices for L ensures that all consumers will
visit one of the ﬁrms in equilibrium.
Next, note that in any equilibrium all ﬁrms choose piU equal to either w/αh or wα`. To
see this, one ﬁrst shows that both ﬁrms must set piU ≥ w/α`. Otherwise, the ﬁrm with the
lower price attracts a positive mass of consumers. All of these consumers receive weakly
higher ex ante expected utility from visiting that ﬁrm. Once they have sunk s visiting that
ﬁrm they strictly prefer to buy there at the equilibrium prices. If the ﬁrm raises its upgrade
price by some amount less than s/α` and keeps its price less than w/α` it will lose no sales.
This would be a proﬁtable deviation. The fact that piU ≥ w/α` implies that consumers
in the low group get no surplus from buying the upgrade. Because of this and because
the diﬀerence in prices for L is assumed to be bounded above by (2αh − α`)/α2
h, which is
less than 1/α`, each ﬁrm attracts a positive mass of consumers in any equilibrium. There
cannot be an equilibrium with w/α` < piU < w/αh because ﬁrm i would gain by raising
its price slightly (if it is making any sales of good H) or by dropping its price to w/α` (if
not). There cannot be an equilibrium with piU > w/αh because ﬁrm i will sell no units of
H, but would make positive sales by dropping its price to w/α`.
38There cannot be an equilibrium with p1U = p2U = w/αh because then the mass of
customers from each group visiting ﬁrm 1 is exactly the same as when p1U = p2U = w/α`.
The calculation above thus implies that ﬁrm 1 would increases its proﬁts by deviating to
p1U = w/α`. To see that there can not be an equilibrium with p1U = w/αh and p2U = w/α`
note that in this case the mass of low-type consumers visiting ﬁrm 1 would be exactly the
same as in the above calculations, but that ﬁrm 1 would be visited by fewer high types.
This makes the gain from deviating to p1U = w/α` even greater.
QED
Proof of Proposition 2
The result that w > w follows from simple algebra:







⇐⇒ 4(α` + αh)2α2
` > α`αh(5α` − αh)2
⇐⇒ α`(α` − αh)(4α2
` − 13α`αh + αh) > 0.





Another fact that will come in handy is that w < α`−αh
αh . To see this, one can carry out
a calculation similar to that above to show that
α` − αh
αh
> w ⇐⇒ αh(α` − αh)(α2
` + 3α`αh + 4αh) > 0.
(a) To show that the strategy proﬁle where both ﬁrms set piL = p∗
L ≡ c + 1/α` and
piH = p∗
H ≡ c + 1/αh is a sequential equilibrium (when combined with optimal behavior
on the part of consumers) note ﬁrst that the restrictions on w imply that when consumers
anticipate that piL = p∗
L and piH = p∗
H then all consumers will visit the closest ﬁrm, low
types will buy good L and high types will buy good H. (This follows from αh(piH −piL) =
w < w and α`(piH − piL) = (α` − αh)/αh > w > w). Hence, if the ﬁrms follow the given
strategy proﬁle each earns a proﬁt of 1
2α` + 1
2αh.
If ﬁrm 1 deviates to any prices p1L and p1H at which it sells L to low types and H to






















This is a concave function uniquely maximized at p1L = 1
2(c + p∗
L + 1/α`) = c + 1/α` and
p1H = c + 1/αh, so the deviation does not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts.
If ﬁrm 1 sells L to low types and H to high types and sells to no or all customers in
one (or both) markets then it is strictly worse oﬀ: zero sales earn zero rather than positive
39proﬁts; and when selling to all customers of type j ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts from sales to type
j consumers are no greater than the proﬁts it would have earned from setting the price
p1j = p∗
j − 1/αj, and proﬁts at this price are lower than the equilibrium proﬁts because
they are given by the formula above.
There is no proﬁtable deviation which involves selling H to low types and L to high
types because the high types will strictly prefer buying H whenever the low types are willing
to buy H.
It is not necessary to check separately whether there is a proﬁtable deviation involving
selling only good L. If ﬁrm 1 has a proﬁtable deviation which involved selling L at a price
of p1L to a subset of the consumers, then it also has an even better proﬁtable deviation in
which it sells H at a price of p1L + w/α` −  to the same set of consumers.
To show that the proﬁle given in (a) is an equilibrium it therefore remains only to show
that there is no proﬁtable deviation involving selling H to both populations. When ﬁrm 1
sells H to at least some of the consumers in each population at a price p1H > c its proﬁts



















L − (p1H − w/α`))

(p1H − c)
(The expression is only an upper lower bound and not necessarily the actual proﬁt level
because the quantity sold in each market is at most one.) This is a quadratic that is
maximized at the unique solution to the ﬁrst-order condition. Diﬀerentiating this expression
we ﬁnd after some algebra that it is maximized for












α. This is no























which is the assumption in the statement of the proposition that w < w. This concludes
the proof that the discriminatory proﬁle described in part (a) of the proposition gives a
sequential equilibrium.
(b) To see that the standard pricing game sometimes has an equilibrium in which all
consumers buy H at a price of c+1/α note ﬁrst that we showed in the proof of Proposition
401 that these prices satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization. This proﬁle
will be an equilibrium if ﬁrm 1 cannot gain either by selling good H to the high types and
nothing to the low types or by selling H to the high types and L to the low types.
In the proof of Proposition 1, I noted that there is no proﬁtable deviation involving only
sales to the high types when α`/αh < (3 +
√
17)/2 because at the price that maximizes
proﬁts from sales to the high types, the ﬁrm will sell to some low types as well. When
α`/αh is larger, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function does have a local maximum at p1H = c+ 1
2α + 1
2αh.








is larger than 1
α only if α`/αh > 5 +
√
32 ≈ 10.66. Hence, for the parameter values of the
proposition, this deviation is not proﬁtable.
In the proof of Proposition 1, the optimal deviation involving selling both H and L could
take any of three forms. Given the restriction on w in Proposition 2 only the second of
these (corresponding to observation 6 in the earlier proof) arises and the optimal deviation
of this form is p1L = c + 1
2α + 1−w
2α` and p1H = c + 1
2α + 1





















A numerical calculation shows that this deviation is never proﬁtable if α`/αh > 6.4. This
is also true when α`/αh is smaller if w is closer to w. In these cases, the speciﬁed proﬁle is
therefore also an equilibrium.
There can be no other symmetric pure strategy equilibria in which the ﬁrms sell good
H to everyone because pH = c1/α is the unique solution to the ﬁrst-order condition that
arises in this case. There can be no equilibrium where the ﬁrms sell L to the high types
and H to the low types for the standard sorting reasons. The only remaining possibility for
another symmetric pure strategy equilibrium is that there might be an equilibrium where
the ﬁrms sell H to the high types and L to the low types, but at price diﬀerent from those
given in part (a) of the proposition.
There can be no such equilibrium with both types strictly preferring to buy the good
they are buying because then the ﬁrst order conditions for each ﬁrm not wanting to raise
or lower each price (used in the existence argument) imply that the equilibrium must have
piL = c + 1/α` and piH = c + 1/αh. There can be no such equilibrium in which the low
types are indiﬀerent to buying H because in that case ﬁrm 1 would proﬁt from lowering
the price of the upgrade by  and selling it to the low types as well. This leaves only
the possibility of an equilibrium in which the high types are buy H and are indiﬀerent to
buying L instead. To see that this doesn’t work, note (as in the proof of Proposition 1)
41that considering the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm 1 deviating and raising or lowering both
p1L and p1H by exactly the same amount shows that the only possible equilibrium of this
form would be to have p1L = c+1/α−w/2α and p1H = c+1/α−w/2α+w/αh. At these
prices, ﬁrm 1 could deviate and raise p1L slightly. This would not aﬀect ﬁrm 1’s sales to





























This is positive if w > w. Hence, there is no equilibrium of this form.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3
(a) Suppose that in a sequential equilibrium both ﬁrms set piL = p∗
L at t = 1. The ﬁrst
thing to note is that at t = 2 the optimal continuation equilibrium for the ﬁrms involves
the add-on being now sold for a price of w/αh (both in equilibrium and following small
deviations).
Claim: If |p1L − p∗
L| < 1/αh and p2L = p∗
L then there is a sequential equilibrium in
which both ﬁrms choose piU = w/αh at t = 2. This is the best equilibrium for the ﬁrms.
To see this note again that because of the structure of the consumer search problem
the only possible equilibrium upgrade prices will be w/α` and w/αh. If both ﬁrms set
piU = w/αh, then at t = 2 the ﬁrm that chose a lower price at t = 1 will be visited by at
least half of the low types and by at most all of the low types. Hence, at least one-third
of the consumers visiting the low priced ﬁrm are high types and the assumption of the
proposition that w/αh > 3w/α` ensures that this ﬁrm is better oﬀ selling to just the high
types. The ﬁrm that set the higher price at t = 1 will be visited my more high types than
low types and is thus also better choosing the high upgrade price.
If ﬁrm 1 deviates from the equilibrium and chooses a price p1L with |p1L − p∗
L| < 1/α`





























= 1 − 2αp1L + αp∗
L + αc − w/2.
42Setting p1L = p∗
L and solving we see that the only possible symmetric equilibrium of this
form is p∗
L = c + 1/α − w/2α. This completes the proof of the uniqueness claim of the
proposition.
The calculation above also implies that no deviation from this proﬁle with |p1L −p∗
L| <
1/α` will increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. To complete the proof that this is indeed an equilibrium
one needs to verify that larger deviations (for which the expression above is not the correct
proﬁt function) also do not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts.
To see that no deviation to a price p1L > p∗
L + 1/α` can increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts, note
































The derivative is decreasing in p1L and after some algebra one can show that it is negative
when evaluated at p∗
L + 1/α` when w ≥ w. Hence, proﬁts from any deviation in this form
are less than the proﬁts from a deviation to p1L = c+1/α`, which are less than the putative
equilibrium proﬁt by the above argument. (Apart from the algebra the result in this case
should also be obvious: ﬁrms are keeping p1L and p1H farther apart than is optimal. It
would make no sense to increase the already too-high price in market H and abandon
market L.)
To see that there is no proﬁtable deviation with p1L < p2L−1/αh note that with such a
price ﬁrm 1 sells to all of the low and high type consumers. (There cannot be an equilibrium
where ﬁrm 2 attracts some high types by charging a low upgrade price because ﬁrm 2 will
attract no low types and hence would always raise its upgrade price by s once consumers
visit it.) Its proﬁts are bounded above by (p∗
L − 1/αh − c) + (p∗
L − 1/αh + w/αh − c). This
is less than the equilibrium proﬁt of p∗
L + w/2αh − c if
p∗
















The restrictions that w < w and α`/αh < 10 imply that the left hand side is less than four.
The right hand side is always greater than four, so the deviation is never proﬁtable.





that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts with such a price are














The proﬁts from such a deviation cannot be proﬁtable if this expression does not have a
local maximum in the interval because we’ve already seen that deviations to either endpoint
of the interval are not proﬁtable. The solution to the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing
the expression above is














































which is true for all w < w as long as α`/αh < 10 because the left hand side is at least
3.32 and the right hand side is at most 4(5.5/
√
10−1) ≈ 2.96. Hence, the deviation cannot
be proﬁtable. (The assumption of the proposition that α`/αh < 10 could be weakened by
computing the proﬁts at the interior optimum when it exists and showing that they remain
below the equilibrium proﬁt level for a broader range of parameter values.)
Part (b) of the proposition is proved in the text.
QED
44